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Abstract: This article analyzes the violence and Joint 
Ministerial Decree against Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia 
(JAI), especially relating to freedom of religion. It argues 
that Indonesia has ratified the International Covenant of 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which guarantees the 
freedom of religion. In addition, Indonesia has also passed 
laws regarding the freedom of religion such as those in the 
1945 constitution. However, these legal foundations have 
failed to guarantee freedom of religion in Indonesia. The 
violence against JAI is the proof of this Not only did the 
government let the incidents occur, but it also issued a 
Joint Ministerial Decree condemning the activities of JAI. 
The situation was exacerbated by the fatwa > of the Council 
of Indonesian `Ulama >’ (MUI) which led to more attacks 
against JAI throughout the country. The article finds that 
the issuance of the decree was not based on need or legal 
basis but was an attempt to please radical groups in society.  
Keywords: Ahmadiyah, freedom of religion, human rights, 
Indonesian Council of `Ulama>’, fatwa>. 
Introduction 
Freedom of religion is considered a most essential right provided 
for every human being in the world.1 As an essential right, no one 
should be able to interfere with it. That is why it is common to 
proclaim  freedom of religion before any other human right. Nor has 
the struggle to protect this right taken place only in this era. According 
                                                 
1  See Jose Casanova, “Private and Public Religion,” Social Research, Vol 59, No. 1 
(Spring 1992), p. 17. He mentioned that religious freedom in the sense of freedom of 
conscience is chronologically “the first freedom”. 
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to Brice Dickson, the struggle for the freedom of belief can be traced 
back to ancient Greece. 2  For that reason, freedom of religion is 
regarded as an international issue and modern states tend to place it in 
the forefront of their constitution.  
In the modern era, that is, since 1945, freedom of religion has been 
guaranteed by international human rights law.3 It is included in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948. The religious 
rights are stated in article 18: 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his 
religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship 
and observance”.4  
Furthermore, this specific article and other civil and political rights’ 
adopted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were expanded 
and developed in 1966 into the International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR). The covenant includes more rules 
concerning the freedom of religion than UDHR such as articles on the 
limitation of freedom to manifest one’s religion and also rules on 
incitement and hatred.  
On 26 October 2005 the Indonesian government ratified this 
covenant into Law No. 12/2005 concerning ICCPR ratification.5  The 
explanation of Law No. 12/2005 states that Indonesia is part of an 
international community committed to the principles of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. The explanation also mentions that 
human rights are fundamental rights inherent in human beings; for that 
reason, these rights must be protected, respected, maintained, and 
                                                 
2  Brice Dickson, “The United Nations and Freedom of Religion,” International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 44, (1995), p. 330. 
3  Geoff Gilbert, “Religious Minorities and Their Rights; A Problem Approach,”  
International  Journal on Minority and Groups Rights, 5 (1997), p. 97. 
4 http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ [Accessed: 25 June 2009]. 
5  Based on Law no 12/2005 Indonesia has ratified on 26 October 2005, see 
http://www.depdagri.go.id/konten.php?nama=ProdukHukum&op=detail_hukum&-
id=166. However according to United Nations, Indonesia ratified ICCPR on 23 Feb 
2006. Possibly Indonesia ratified it on 26 October 205, but reported to the UN on 23 
Feb 2006. See http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg-
_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en. [Accessed: 25 June 2009]. 
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should not be ignored, reduced, or seized by anyone.6 Based on this 
consideration, the Indonesian government decided to ratify the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, with the exception 
of article one regarding the term of self determination.7  
Besides those international rules, Indonesia has also passed laws 
regarding freedom of religion. The 1945 constitution (UUD 1945), 
specifically Article 29 (part 2), states: “The state will guarantee the 
freedom to every resident to adhere to their respective religion and to 
perform their religious duties in accordance with their religion and that 
faith.”8 Another regulation can be found in an amendment of the 1945 
constitution, Article 28E, which states “Every person shall be free to 
choose and to practice the religion of his/her choice, to choose one’s 
education, to choose one’s employment, to choose one’s citizenship, 
and to choose one’s place of residence within the state territory, to 
leave it and then to return to it”.  It is also stipulated in article 28E(2): 
“Every person shall have the right to the freedom to believe his/her 
faith (kepercayaan), and to express his/her views and thoughts, in 
accordance with  his/her conscience”.9 To implement this constitution, 
Indonesia enacted Law No. 39/1999 concerning Human Rights. It is 
stated, in Article 8 Law No 39/1999, that the main responsibility for 
                                                 
6  Law No. 12/2005, accessed online at http://www.depdagri.go.id/konten.php?-
nama= ProdukHukum&op=detail_hukum&id=166. [Accessed:  25 June 2009].   
7 It is mentioned that “With reference to Article 1 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia declares that, 
consistent with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples, and the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States, and the relevant 
paragraph of the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action of 1993, the words “the 
right of self-determination” appearing in this article do not apply to a section of people 
within a sovereign independent state and cannot be construed as authorizing or 
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states.” See 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en. [Accessed: 28 June 2009].  
8 The translation adopted from http://dss.ucsd.edu/~mshugart/ied/pdfs/ indonesia/ 
indonesian _constitution_ 1945.doc. [Accessed: 28 June 2009]. 
9 The translation adopted from translation made by Indonesian embassy in Canada, see 
www.indonesia-ottawa.org/indonesia/constitution/fourth_amendment_const.pdf. 
[Accessed: 28 June 2009].  
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protecting, promoting, upholding, and fulfilling Human Rights rests 
upon the government.10  
From the regulations mentioned above, it can be concluded that 
Indonesia has made a good effort to maintain and protect religious 
practices for every citizen. In its constitution, enacted in 1945 by 
Indonesia’s founding fathers, the diversity of cultures and religions in 
Indonesia has been fully recognized. The ratification of ICCPR and 
also the creation of laws concerning human rights present further 
proof of the serious efforts of the government in this regard. 
Therefore, considering these regulations, it cought to be clear that 
religious violence or any activity which violates the freedom of religion 
should not happen in this country.  
Unfortunately, it is not always easy for the state to realize its will to 
perform well in the realm of moral and legal obligations. This reality 
can be seen from several incidents regarding human rights violations, 
especially concerning the issue of freedom of religion. These incidents 
started when Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) held an annual meeting 
in Bogor, West Java. They stated that they had received the permission 
from the police to conduct the meeting on 15 July 2005. Nevertheless, 
the conference was attacked by several Islamist groups, namely Front 
Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defenders Front) and the Lembaga Penelitian 
dan Pengkajian Islam (LPPI, Islamic Research and Study Institute). 
Coincidently, this incident ended with the announcement of the fatwa > 
by the Council of Indonesian `Ulama >’ (MUI) which declared 
Ahmadiyah as a deviant sect and categorized as non-Islamic.11  
These two occurrences led to increasing attacks on Ahmadiyah’s 
activities and centers in some provinces. On 6 January 2006 there was 
                                                 
10 It also mentions the freedom of religion’s right. It is stated in article 22 part 1 and 2; 
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom to choose his religion and to worship according 
to the teachings of his religion and beliefs, (2) The state guarantees everyone the 
freedom to choose and practice his religion and to worship according to his religion 
and beliefs. For complete text see http://hrli.alrc.net/mainfile.php/indonleg/133/. 
[Accessed: 28 June 2009]. 
11 It is written that Ahmadiyah doctrines is out of the path of Islam, heretical and 
deviating (with bold ink), and a Muslim who has joined this doctrine is an apostate.  
Keputusan Fatwa Majelis Ulama Indonesia No.11/Munas VII/MUI/15/2005 tentang 
Aliran Ahmadiyah, 29 July 2005. Article can be accessed at http://www.mui.or.id/-
files/11-Fat-Munas-Ahmadiyah.pdf. [Accessed: 31 October 2008]. 
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an attack on an Ahmadiyah mosque in Bogor, West Java.12 It was also 
reported that the Ahmadiyah community in Lingsar, West Lombok 
was assailed by several people on 29 January 2006.13 On 17 February 
2006, an Ahmadiyah center was attacked by a mob in Bulukumba, 
South Sulawesi.14 With these events there arose a vigorous pro-contra 
debate concerning the existence of Jamaah Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. 
This reached its peak when FPI (Islamic Defenders Front) attacked 
religious-tolerance activists AKKBB (Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan 
Beragama dan Berkeyakinan) on June 1st 2008. After several more 
conflicts and violence occurred on 9 June 2008, the state reacted by 
passing a Joint Ministerial Decree “to freeze” the activities of the 
Ahmadiyah sect.  
These occurrences led many to question whether the Indonesian 
government seriously promotes the freedom of religion. For this 
reason, this article focuses on the position of the freedom of religion in 
Indonesia. It particularly examines how the government interprets 
principles of freedom of religion, taking policies on Ahmadiyah as a 
case study. In the first place, the article discusses the history of 
Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. It then explores the position of the Council 
of Indonesian `Ulama>’ with its fatwa> and its impacts regarding the 
violence against the Ahmadiyah.   
Ahmadiyah and Its Legal Position in Indonesian History 
Originally, Ahmadiyah was a religious reformist movement 
emerging for the first time among some Muslims of the Punjab during 
the last decades of the nineteenth century. According to Ahmadiyah 
Lahore website, it was founded around 1890.15  The founder of this 
movement was Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, a religious leader who declared 
himself a promised Messiah and Mahdi > to the Muslim world.16  
                                                 
12 “Lima Perusak Masjid Ahmadiyah Jadi Tersangka,” Tempo Daily Newspaper, 9 January 
2006. 
13 “Terpojok  di Negeri Sendiri,” Tempo Daily Newspaper, 5 February 2006. 
14 See “Lagi Massa Serbu Markas Ahmadiyah,” Indopos Daily Newspaper, 18 February 
2006. 
15 http://ahmadiyya.org/intro/summary.pdf. [Accessed: 1 July 2009]. 
16  Spencer Lavan, The Ahmadiyah Movement: A History and Perspective (New Delhi: 
Manohar Book Service, 1974), p. 2 
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Many Muslims, especially from mainstream Sunni > groups have 
rejected and condemned the group because of its teachings.  Most of 
them consider Ahmadiyah heretics and non-Islamic. In the eyes of 
mainstream Sunni > Islam, certain Ahmadiyah ideas are seen as heretical. 
Among them are the claims that the founder had the ability to speak 
with God and regarded himself as muh }addith. Ahmadiyah also claim 
that Jesus didn’t die on the cross, but lived and went to Kashmir and 
died there at the age of 120. The most controversial idea is the claim 
that Allah appointed the founder of Ahmadiyah as a prophet.17 This 
statement emerged in 1904 when the founder stated that he indeed 
believed that Muhammad was the seal of the prophet, but he also 
believed that he himself was a prophet who had the duty to guide 
people before the coming of Judgment Day.18  All of these ideas are 
contrary to mainstream Islamic teachings, making many Muslim 
mainstream groups regard Ahmadiyah’s teachings as heretical and 
people who follow them as non-Muslims.  
Adherents of Ahmadiyah split into two groups after they went 
through a crisis of leadership, especially after the successor of Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad, Nūr al-Dīn, died in 1914.19 The disagreement within 
Ahmadiyya created two factions, Ahmadiyah Qadiyani led by Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad’s son, Mahmud Ahmad, and Ahmadiyah Lahore led 
by Muh}ammad `Alī and Khwāja Kamāl al-Dīn. The differences 
between them do not lie in terms of leadership only, but also in 
religious thought. Ahmadiyah Lahore is more sympathetic in 
approaching other Muslims; they believe that non-Ahmadis are 
considered Muslim. This position differs from that of the Ahmadi 
Qadiyani which insists that non-Ahmadis are infidels. The most 
important disagreement between the two groups  concerns belief in 
the prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. Lahore prefers to use the 
word mujaddid for this doctrine, not prophet. In Qadiyani belief, 
Ghulam Ahmad was a prophet and this religious authority is 
                                                 
17 Encyclopedia of Islam, Accessed online at http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/-
uid=1380/entry?result _number =1&entry=ei3_COM-0007&search_text=ahmadiyya-
#hit. [Accessed: 1 July 2009].    
18 Francis Robinson, “Ahmad and the Ahmadiyya,” History Today, 40: 6 (June, 1990), p. 
43. 
19 Lavan, The Ahmadiyah Movement, p. 106. 
  JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 03, Number 02, December 2009 
396 
Muhammad As'ad 
maintained for his successor, Nūr al-Dīn, and his son Mahmud 
Ahmad.20  
Aside from these differences, they also have common ideas, such 
as belief in the death of Jesus and the idea of peaceful jiha>d. However, 
it is interesting to note that, even though they belong to the same root, 
i.e. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad‘s teachings, these two groups rarely 
cooperate with each other. Ahmadiyah Lahore deals mainly with the 
issue of Islamic modernism and tries to make few references which 
will distinguish them from mainstream Islam. The Qadiyani, on the 
other hand, tend to maintain the prophethood of Ghulam Ahmad and 
to be more sectarian than Lahore, especially in terms of missionary 
activity and the superiority of Islam in the Western world.21 meanwhile, 
both groups have expanded widely all over the world, in Europe, West 
Africa, and Indonesia.22 
In Indonesia, Ahmadiyah appeared for the first time in 1925.23 It 
was first encountered when, in 1922, three Indonesian students visited 
India; they had heard that Islamic education in India was good and 
equal to the Middle East. For that reason they went there, and 
happened to choose Qadiyan as their place of study. These Indonesian 
students in Qadiyan informed their Indonesian fellows about the 
quality of the study and the low cost of living in Qadiyan. For poor 
people, it was also possible to get scholarship. Thus, they encouraged 
people to follow them and study at Qadiyani School. In 1924 they 
returned to Indonesia and asked permission to preach in Indonesia. 
The request was granted in 1925, whereupon Rahmat Ali, a qadiyani 
muballigh, went to Sumatra and undertook Ahmadi missionary 
activities.24   
                                                 
20 Encyclopedia of Islam, Accessed online at http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/-
uid=1380/entry?result _number =1&entry=ei3_COM-0007&search_text=ahmadiyya-
#hit. [Accessed: 1 July 2009].    
21 Margaret Blood, “The Ahmadiyah In Indonesia: Its early History and Contribution 
to Islam in the Archipelago,” (Unpublished Honour Sub-thesis, Department of 
Indonesian Languages and Literatures, The Australian National University, 1974), p. 
13. 
22 Encyclopedia of Islam, Accessed online at http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/-
uid=1380/entry?result _number =1&entry=ei3_COM-0007&search_text=ahmadiyya-
#hit. [Accessed: 1 July 2009]. 
23 Blood, The Ahmadiyah In Indonesia, p. 17. 
24 Ibid., p. 19. 
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However, according to Margaret Blood, the arrival of Ahmadiyah 
Qadiyani was later than Ahmadiyah Lahore. She stated that Lahore was 
introduced in Jogjakarta, Central Java in 1924. Unlike Qadiyani 
Indonesia which was derived from Indonesian students studying at 
Qadiyan, Ahmadiyah Lahore expanded in Indonesia through 
coincident activities. It was reported that the first Lahore preachers 
who came to Indonesia were Mirza Wali Ahmad Baig and Maulana 
Ahmad. Their first destination was Manila, but because they ran out of 
money, they were forced to stay in Indonesia.25   
According to a book by Iskandar Zukarnain, in which he explains 
the Ahmadiyah movement in Indonesia, Ahmadiyah Qadiyani in 
Sumatra was rejected strongly by local `ulama>’. This refusal emerged 
because Qadiyani preachers, from their first arrival had begun 
propagating Ahmadiyya teachings to the local community. They also 
attacked other Muslims’ beliefs, which led to their ideas being rejected 
by local `ulama>’ at once. This behaviour was very different from that of 
the Lahore group, who tended to work cooperatively with other 
Muslims. Usually, they hid their Ahmadi identity and tried to get 
sympathetic responses from others. Nevertheless, after acknowledging 
their Ahmadi beliefs, many Muslims would immediately reject them 
and bar them from the Muslim community. 26   
In terms of formal institutions, even though Ahmadiyah Qadiyani 
had existed in Indonesia since 1925, the creation of its national 
headquarters or hoofdbestuur only occurred ten years afterwards, i.e. in 
1935. Before this, they already had several provincial centres in 
Sumatra, Western Java and Batavia (Jakarta). The central board was 
established on 16 December 1935 in Jakarta. At first, this organization 
was called Ahmadiyah Qadiyan Department Indonesia. On December 
1949, after a national conference in Jakarta, the participants agreed to 
change Ahmadiyah Qadiyan Department Indonesia to Jama’ah 
Ahmadiyah Indonesia. This organization had structural and formal 
relations with the Ahmadiyah Headquarters in India because its 
chairman (ami >r) was responsible directly to the khali >fah in Qadiyan.27                         
In later periods, Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia (JAI) repeatedly 
proposed its legal existence to the Ministry of Law. After several 
                                                 
25 Ibid., p. 25. 
26 Iskandar Zulkarnain, Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia (Jogjakarta: LKIS, 2005), p. 192  
27 Ibid, p. 195 
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efforts, they received ministerial decree from the Ministry of law No. 
JA.5/23/13 on 13 March 1953.28  By this decree, Jamaah Ahmadiyah 
Indonesia received acknowledgment as a legal organization by the 
government. Furthermore, in 2003, Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia also 
received another legal status as a social organization from Directorate 
for Relations with Political Institutions of Ministry Home affairs with 
decision No. 75//DI/VI/2003.29 These decisions confirm the legal 
position of Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia, since from 1953 to 2003 the 
government had granted them legal status. For that reason, in terms of 
legal existence, Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia is on solid ground. 
Unlike Ahmadiyah Qadiyan, Ahmadiyah Lahore in Indonesia has 
no structural connection with its international headquarters in Lahore. 
Not only does Ahmadiyah Lahore reject the idea of the prophethood 
of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, it also doesn’t recognize the system of 
khila >fah as performed by Ahmadiyah Qadiyani. According to 
Zukarnain, Ahmadiyah Lahore doesn’t have an organizational structure. 
In most countries, Ahmadiyah Lahore consists of groups of people 
forming a loose association. This is the case in Indonesia, which again 
suggests that Ahmadiyah Lahore in this country doesn’t have any 
structural connection with its headquarters in Lahore. Mostly, its 
relations are created only through letters and magazines.30  
Overall, even though JAI and GAI exist in Indonesia and have 
several branches, in gaining followers, they can be considered to have 
failed. Not only have they had difficulties in gaining followers, they 
have also been rejected and even challenged by mainstream Islam in 
Indonesia especially from `ulama>’ and many Islamic organizations. 
Basically, they have challenged the doctrine of Ahmadiyah which 
proclaims that there is a prophet after Muhammad. Aside from that, 
many other teachings are rejected. Take for instance the 
acknowledgment of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet and Imam 
Mahdi, his ability to speak with God, and also the claim that Jesus 
didn’t die on the cross. These are the most controversial issues for 
Indonesian Islam and as any other Sunni > Muslims in the world, 
                                                 
28 Ibid., p. 196 
29 Alfitri, “Religious Liberty in Indonesia and the Rights of “Deviant” Sects,” Asian 
Journal of Comparative Law, Volume 3, Issue 1 (2008), p. 19. 
30 Zulkarnain, Gerakan Ahmadiyah di Indonesia, p. 202. 
  399 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 03, Number 02, December 2009 
Ahmadiyah and the Freedom of Religion in Indonesia 
Indonesian Muslims have reacted harshly and condemn them as non-
Muslim.    
The Fatwa > of the Council of Indonesian `Ulama>’ (MUI) and the 
Attack against Ahmadiyah  
The first fatwa> regarding Ahmadiyah in Indonesia can be traced 
back to 1935, when Nahdlatul Ulama, nowadays known as the biggest 
Muslims organization in Indonesia, held a meeting to discuss 
Ahmadiyah. At that time they agreed to issue a fatwa> condemning 
Ahmadiyah as aberrant, and as infidels and apostates.31 Another fatwa > 
was put forward five years later when an association of the `ulama >’ in 
East Sumatra issued the same fatwa > which categorized Ahmadiyah as 
an infidel group and non-Islamic. However, though they stigmatized 
Ahmadiyah as a deviant sect, they had not yet reached any decision to 
dissolve Ahmadiyah as a religious organization.32 
A fatwa> from an official institution of `ulama>’ came to the forefront 
much later in 1980, when the MUI issued a fatwa> regarding the 
Ahmadiyah group.33 This fatwa> was issued after the council held its 
second national conference on 26 May – 1 June 1980.34 At that time it 
was concluded that “in line with data and facts found in nine books on 
Ahmadiyah, the Council of Indonesian `Ulama >’, issues a fatwa> that the 
Ahmadiyah is a non-Islamic group, heretical and deviating”. 35  The 
fatwa> was by no means the last on Ahmadiyah; it was followed by 
another fatwa> in 1984. This fatwa> may be regarded as explanation of the 
previous one because it contains clearer views of the MUI on 
Ahmadiyah’s doctrines. Three decisions resulted from that fatwa >. The 
                                                 
31 Erni Budiwanti, Pluralism Collapses: A Study of the Jama'ah Ahmadiyah Indonesia and Its 
Persecution (Working Paper Series, Asia Research Institute, National University of 
Singapore), p. 13. Accessed from http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/docs/wps/wps09-
_117.pdf. [Accessed: 1 July 2009] 
32 Ibid., p. 13. 
33 Official means created by the government 
34 Mimbar Ulama, No. 40 (1980), p. 24. Mimbar Ulama is the official magazine of 
Indonesian Council of Ulama. 
35 The translation of fatwa> on Ahmadiyah in 1980 adapted from Lilik Rofiqoh, “The 
Fatwas of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia on the Ahmadiyah doctrines, the Problem of 
Religious Authority and Tolerance,” (Unpublished thesis, Leiden University, 2008), p. 
93.  
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decisions are (1) That the Council of Indonesian `Ulama>’ (MUI), the 
provincial and districts, all `ulama>’, and preachers throughout Indonesia 
explain the heretical doctrines of the Ahmadiyah Qadian which are 
non-Islamic; (2) Those who have already joined the Jamaah 
Ahmadiyah Qadian should return to true Islamic doctrines; (3) Muslim 
communities should increase their alertness in order not to get 
influenced by their heretical doctrines.36  
To a certain extent this fatwa> was a reaction of Indonesian Muslims 
to the fatwa> of the Muslim World League. As a member of this Muslim 
organization, Indonesia was supposed to acknowledge its decision. On 
10 April 1974, the Muslim World League issued a fatwa> which 
announced that Ahmadiyah was prohibited and should be considered 
non-Muslims. After this fatwa> was enacted, several of its members, for 
instance Malaysia and Pakistan, decided to ban Ahmadiyah from their 
countries. Like them, the enactment of the fatwa> on Ahmadiyah in 
Indonesia can be considered an effect of the World Muslim League’s 
fatwa>.  
However, the MUI’s fatwa > often gave a negative effect to the 
people, especially for those who used it as a legitimation for the violent 
attacks against the Ahmadiyah group. It can be said that the fatwa> 
encouraged them to use violence, especially the violence which 
happened in 2005 onwards.  
According to a report by The Wahid Institute, a non Govern-
mental Organization created by former President Abdurrahman Wahid, 
the attack against Ahmadiyah happened when Jamaah Ahmadiyah 
Indonesia (JAI) held an annual meeting called Jalsah Salanah. The 
meeting began on 8 July 2005 in Bogor, Western Java. On the second 
day,  9 July, many people gathered outside the building screaming and 
shouting for a ban on Ahmadiyah. Many of them used sharp words, 
saying that Ahmadiyah was a deviant sect and should be banned from 
Indonesia. Their condemnation was based on the MUI’s fatwa>s in 1980 
and 1984.  
The protesters even created a place in front of the conference, 
namely Posko Pembubaran Ahmadiyah (Post for Dissolving Ahmadiyah). 
The crowd was led by Amin Djamaluddin, the head of Lembaga 
Penelitian dan Pengkajian Islam (LPPI-Islamic Research and Study 
                                                 
36 Mimbar Ulama, No. 323 (2005), p. 8. 
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Institute). 37  After several hours, the crowd started to attack the 
building with bottles, stones and wood. As a result of this attack, many 
people were injured. Furthermore, according to the investigation by 
the Indonesian Commission of Human rights, even though the crowd 
attacked the conference en masse, the participants within decided not to 
retaliate and remained in the building.38 
The next day, 10 July 2005, a statement claiming to come from a 
representative of Muslims in Indonesia, demanded Bogor municipality 
dismiss Ahmadiyah and close their Headquarters in Bogor. This 
demand was followed by a threat written in block letters stating that if 
there was no action from the government, the crowd would react 
radically to dismiss and destroy Ahmadiyah headquarters.39    
Because of this threat, on 14 July 2005, the leader of JAI sent a 
letter to the police asking for protection. The response to this letter 
was completely unexpected. It was answered by a letter signed by 
House of Representatives, district Bogor, Bogor Police department, 
district attorney and other municipal leaders, stating that they agreed to 
shut down  the activities of JAI in its Headquarters in Bogor.40  
On the next day 15 July 2005, as mentioned in their threatening 
statement, Habib Abdurrahman, a leader of Front Pembela Islam (FPI, 
Islamic Defenders Front) came to the Ahmadiyah Headquarters with 
3000 people. He stated that if they did not eject themselves from the 
building, it would be burnt down and destroyed. Because of this threat, 
the representatives of JAI negotiated with the police and municipal 
staff. After these negotiations between JAI and the government, it was 
agreed that the participants would be evacuated by bus and truck.  
During the negotiations, the crowd attacked several buildings 
inside the headquarters, especially in the Lajnah Imaillah site, a building 
which is exclusively for women’s activities. The crowd burnt down 
several houses and other buildings, including one library. They also 
plundered houses where most participants stayed. Ironically, even 
though police officers were there, no action was taken to prevent the 
                                                 
37  Ahmad Suaedy (ed.), Politisasi Agama dan Konflik Komunal; Beberapa Isu Penting di 
Indonesian (Jakarta: The Wahid Institute, 2007), pp. 224-225. 
38 M.M Billah, Laporan Sementara Pemantauan Kasus Ahmadiyah (Jakarta: Komnas HAM, 
2006), p. 35. 
39 Suaedy, Politisasi Agama, p. 229. 
40 Ibid., p. 230. 
  JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 03, Number 02, December 2009 
402 
Muhammad As'ad 
crowd from their destructive activities. Participants finally succeeded in 
evacuating the building while the attack and the plundering still 
continued. Before the crowd withdrew from Ahmadiyah headquarter, 
they put a banner on the building with writing “This building is sealed 
by Indonesian Muslims”. After that incident, the municipal authority 
of Bogor enacted a statement letter which forbids any activities of 
Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia in its district. This letter can be seen as 
confusing because JAI is the victim not the one who created the chaos, 
they even sent a letter to the district authority to protect their activities, 
but the result was shocking. The police didn’t arrest any people who 
attack their headquarters, instead they enacted a letter which 
condemned and prohibited the existence of JAI headquarter in 
Bogor.41  
After the incident, the Indonesian Council of `Ulama >’ (MUI) held a 
national conference on 26-29 July 2005. According to the report 
published in Mimbar Ulama, the objective of MUI national conference 
was to give opinion regarding social issues in the society. One of the 
issues discussed in this meeting was regarding the Ahmadiyah case 
with reference to the recent incidents in order to find the appropriate 
reaction by the MUI on this situation.42 Based on this meeting and 
prior to two fatwa>s of the MUI resulted in 1980 and 1984, the MUI 
decided to create another fatwa> which would ban both groups of 
Ahmadiyah, Ahmadiyah Qadiyan materialized in Jamaah Ahmadiyah 
Indonesia (JAI) and Ahmadiyah Lahore, which was never mentioned 
in the previous fatwa>. The conference itself enacted eleven fatwa>s 
regarding many issues such as, fatwa> on the prohibition of pluralism, 
liberalism and secularism, intellectual rights and so on.43  
                                                 
41 Ibid., p. 233. 
42 Mimbar Ulama, No. 323 (2005), p. 8.  
43 There are several works which discuss the role of Indonesian council of ulama, one 
of them is M.B Hooker in his book Indonesian Islam, Social Change Through Contemporary 
Fatawa, in this book he argues that the main function of the MUI especially from 1975 
to 1990’s is to support, and in some cases to justify government policy and 
programmes. See M. B. Hooker, Indonesian Islam, Social Change through Contemporary 
Fatawa (Hawai: University of Hawai Press). The other is Atho Mudzhar, different from 
Hooker who thinks that MUI’s fatwa > is only used as legitimating the government policy, 
Mudzhar argues differently. He said that MUI’s fatwa> is not always functioned as 
legitimation of the government’s policy, because some are against. See Atho Mudzhar, 
Fatwas of the Council of Indonesian Ulama: A Study of Islamic Legal Thought in Indonesia 1975-
1988 (Jakarta: INIS, 1993). The third one is Nur Ichwan whom conclusion much the 
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In the fatwa> concerning Ahmadiyah , MUI puts an emphasis on its 
deviation and, once again, declares it as a non Muslim group. This fatwa > 
also mentions two aspects which are not mentioned in the two 
previous fatwa>s. Firstly, it refers to the Muslim World League’s fatwa > 
which forbids and condemns the existence of the Ahmadiyah and 
secondly is the mentioning of the Ahmadiyah claim of the 
prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. In short, the fatwa> comprises 
several decisions. First, the the fatwa> affirms the decree of the fatwa> of 
the Council of Ulama in the second conference in 1980 which decided 
that the Ahmadiyya’s doctrines are beyond the path of Islam, heretical 
and deviating; and a Muslim who join this doctrine is apostate. Second, 
the fatwa> asserts that those who joined the Ahmadiyah doctrines must 
return immediately to the true Islam based on the Qur’a>n and the 
tradition of the Prophet Muh }ammad. Third, the fatwa>  obliges the 
government to ban the dissemination of the Ahmadiyah doctrines 
throughout Indonesia and to annul the organization as well as to close 
down all of its offices. 
The crucial point in that fatwa> is the third one which proposes that 
the government take legal measure against the Ahmadiyah group. It 
even states that the government must ban and close all Ahmadiyah 
offices in Indonesia. To support and strengthen this fatwa>, the MUI 
held several meetings in the month of August 2005, such as the 
meeting with other Muslims stakeholders, such as the Front Pembela 
Islam (FPI, Islamic Defenders Front) and the Lembaga Penelitian dan 
Pengkajian Islam (LPPI, Islamic Research and Study Institute) and also 
with the representatives of Indonesian Legislative Assembly (DPR). 
The result of these meetings was the decision taken by MUI to send a 
letter to the government declaring that Ahmadiyah had caused social 
                                                                                                      
same as Hooker, he said that from its political expression, the MUI can be regarded as 
subjugated by the new order government. See Nur Ichwan, ‘Ulama State and Politics: 
MUI after Suharto’, Islamic Law and Society, 12, 1 (2005), pp. 45–72. However all of 
them agree that the notion of the MUI after reformation era (after 1998) is different 
from its notion before. After reformation era, the MUI has been tempted to take a side 
on political issues. Another postulate made by Gilispie stated that after reformation era, 
MUI has been influence by the hardliners within Indonesian Muslims. What happens 
to the fatwa> against Ahmadiyah can be regarded as this influence. See Piers Gillespie, 
“Current Issues in Indonesian Islam: Analysing the 2005 Council of Indonesian Ulama 
Fatwā no. 7 Opposing Pluralism, Liberalism and Secularism”, Journal of Islamic Studies, 
18, 2 (2007), pp. 202–240. 
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unrest and conflict within Indonesian society. Therefore MUI 
encouraged the government to ban Ahmadiyah doctrines and to 
revoke their status as an official organization.44          
The controversies around MUI’s fatwa> and its effects on the people 
snowballed. Violence against Ahmadiyah  increased, including the 
attack on an Ahmadiyah mosque in Bogor, Western Java on 6 January 
2006. Also reported was an attack against an Ahmadiyah community in 
Lingsar, West Lombok on 29 January 2006. On 17 February 2006, 
another Ahmadiyah center was attacked by a mob in Bulukumba, 
South Sulawesi.  
In time, the government, through the President, instructed the 
Team of the Coordinating Board for Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in 
Society (TIM Bakorpakem45) to conduct a survey on Ahmadiyah.46 The 
work of this team can be regarded as very long, and suppressed by 
demands by certain Muslim groups, as can be seen from the fact that it 
worked for two years from 2006 without any practical solution. In the 
end, they seem only to have appeased the demands of radical Muslims. 
On 16 April 2008 and after several mass demonstrations, the TIM 
Bakorpakem concluded that JAI deviated from Islam. The team also 
recommended that a joint ministerial decree be issued, in accordance 
with the 1965 law on blasphemy, warning JAI to cease its actions, and 
if the warning was not heeded, that JAI would be dissolved.47 
Bakorpakem’s conclusion provoked strong reactions, both in 
people who demanded the dissolution of the Ahmadiyah such as the 
hard-line Islamic groups, and also in Muslims who disagreed with the 
decision and demanded that Ahmadiyah be allowed to exist in 
                                                 
44 Rofiqoh, “The Fatwas of the Majelis Ulama Indonesia,” p.47 
45 According to International Crisis Group, Bakorpakem had been established in 1984, 
at the height of Soeharto-era repression, and was basically an intelligence body to 
monitor the innumerable sects Indonesia seems to produce, determine if they 
constituted a threat to the government and ban them if they did. Its legal basis was a 
1965 presidential decree on blasphemy, issued by Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, 
just before he fell from power, and incorporated into a new security law by his 
successor, Soeharto, in 1969. See International Crisis Group report on Ahmadiyah,  p. 
3. It can be accessed at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/-
indonesia/b78_indonesia___implications_of_the_ahmadiyah_decree.pdf. [Accessed: 1 
January 2009] .  
46 Budiwanti, Pluralism Collapses, p. 15  
47 International Crisis Group report on Ahmadiyah, p, 6. 
  405 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 03, Number 02, December 2009 
Ahmadiyah and the Freedom of Religion in Indonesia 
Indonesia out of respect for freedom of religion in the country. The 
latter even created an alliance, namely the National Alliance for 
Freedom of Religion and Belief (Aliansi Kebangsaan Untuk 
Kebebasan Beragama dan Berkeyakinan, AKKBB). Most of the 
members were Muslim intellectuals, journalists and other figures, 
including the former Indonesian President, Abdurrahman Wahid. 48 
After Bakorpakem’s recommendation was issued, both groups 
arranged repeated street demonstrations. Convinced of their own 
respective views,, the hard-line groups demanded that the government 
apply the decision to dissolve Ahmadiyah as soon as possible, while 
the AKBB demanded the cancellation of the recommendation.  
Pro and contra opinions about the existence of the Ahmadiyah 
group escalated until, on 1 June 2008, there was a violent clash. That 
day AKKBB, including hundreds of Ahmadiyah followers, arranged a 
peaceful demonstration in the name of freedom of religion and 
religious tolerance in Indonesia. At the same time, there was another 
demonstration led by Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI, Indonesian Party 
of Liberation) and FPI to protest an increase in the oil price. 
Coincidently, both demonstrations were held at the same location in 
Jakarta and at the same time. After several hours of, the AKKBB 
group was attacked by the hardliners with sticks. They attacked and 
called for the dismissal of Ahmadiyah. This attack caused many injuries, 
mostly among the AKKBB demonstrators.49  
Immediately the attack became a national issue. To end the 
controversies concerning Ahmadiyah, on 9 June 2008 the Indonesian 
government decided to announce a Joint Ministerial Decree banning 
the activities of Ahmadiyah. This decree consists of five points. First, it 
warns all citizens not to discuss, endorse or seek public support for an 
interpretation of a religion followed in Indonesia, or undertake 
religious activities that resemble the activities of such a religion, in a 
way that deviates from the central tenets of that religion. Second, it 
warns followers, members and/or leaders of the Indonesian 
Ahmadiyah Congregation (Jamaah Ahmadiyah Indonesia, JAI), as long 
as they claim to be Muslims, to stop dissemination of interpretations 
that deviate from the main teachings of Islam, that is, spreading the 
understanding that there was a prophet after the Prophet Mohammed. 
                                                 
48 Ibid., p. 6. 
49 Ibid., p. 7. 
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Third, it warns that the followers, members and or leaders of JAI who 
do not heed these warnings and instructions mentioned above may 
face legal sanctions in accordance with laws and regulations. Fourth, it 
warns members of the public to safeguard and protect religious 
harmony as well as public order and not undertake actions and/or 
behavior that violate the law against followers, members and or leaders 
of JAI. Finally, it notes that members of the public who do not heed 
the warnings outlined in the first and fourth points above can face 
legal sanctions.50 
The legal basis of this decree is the law on religious deviation and 
offence (No. 1/PNPS/1965). Interestingly, this law was a product of 
the old regime under Sukarno, who created his own political concept, 
which he called guided democracy. Sukaron’s law declares that the 
government or the president can ban a religious organization or sect.51 
Questioning the Freedom of Religion in Indonesia   
This article started with the observation that Indonesia was a 
signatory to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Not only that, 
Indonesia had also ratified the International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), recognized as an expanded version of the 
UDHR. That ratification even developed into a national law (No. 
12/2005). Even though Indonesian included a reservation concerning 
Article One, this particular article had nothing to do with freedom of 
religion; it dealt with the definition of the term ‘self determination’.52 
Considering all this, Indonesia cannot now deny the stipulations of the 
covenant, especially Article 18, which states that “everyone shall have 
the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right 
shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his 
choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others 
                                                 
50 The English translation adapted from  International Crisis Group report, Interna-
tional Crisis Group report on Ahmadiyah. p, 6. The full text can be downloaded from. 
See http://www.thepersecution.org/ world/indonesia/docs.skb.html. [Accessed: 20 
July 2009] 
51  Leena Avonius, “Freedom of Religion in Indonesia,” ISIM Review 22 (Autumn 
2008), p. 48. 
52  See http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en. [Accessed: 25 June 2009].  
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and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice and teaching”.53 
Furthermore, Indonesia has plenty of rules which pertain directly 
or indirectly to the guarantee of the freedom of religion. The 
Indonesian Constitution (UUD 1945) Article 29 (part 2) clearly states 
this freedom. Article 28E also mentions that “every person shall be 
free to choose and to practice the religion of his/her choice”. The 
second item of this article also mentions that people have the freedom 
to believe according to his or her own faith. Besides the constitution, 
Indonesia also lays down this freedom in Law No. 39/1999 
concerning Human Rights, which stipulates that the government is 
responsible for protecting, promoting, upholding, and fulfilling Human 
Rights. 
Limitations or restrictions on freedom of religion can be applied 
only in certain circumstances. ICCPR Article 18 (3) states that 
“freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to 
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect 
public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others”. 54  However, if we look at the Indonesian 
Constitution, whether the original one or amended version, there are 
no rules or items which contain limitations or restrictions. It mentions 
only freedom of religion, not its limitation. In any case, the joint 
ministerial decree which declared that Ahmadiyah should stop 
disseminating its teachings never stated that the reason for its decision 
was to protect public safety, order, or morality and fundamental rights 
of others (ICCPR’ limitation). On the contrary, it was simply alleged 
that Ahmadiyah resembled the activities of an existing religion (Islam). 
Basically, if we go by Indonesian law referring to the freedom of 
religion, it is almost impossible to restrict a religion or believer who 
believes in his own religion.   
However, the term ‘freedom of religion’ in Indonesia is different 
from the universal term as applied in the Western world. In UDHR or 
ICCPR, the term ‘freedom of religion’ means that people can manifest 
any religion, believe in it and exist alongside any other religions. In 
Indonesia, ‘freedom of religion’ means that people can embrace one of 
the religions recognized by the Government. In this matter, Indonesia 
                                                 
53 See http://www2.ochr.org/english/law/ccpr.html. [Accessed: 25 July 2009]. 
54 Ibid. 
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recognizes only six religions: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, 
Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism. People cannot manifest a 
new religion or embrace a religion other those six religions, such as 
Judaism, Sikhism or others. If they do, they do not have the right to 
live and practice it in Indonesia. This arrangement is regulated by a law 
concerning religious deviation and offence (No. 1/PNPS/1965). The 
joint ministerial decree also refers to this law. In this matter, it can be 
concluded that religious freedom in Indonesia is not really free, 
because it is confined only to six religions. Therefore, even if 
Ahmadiyah followers declared themselves non-Muslims and decide to 
manifest their own religion as Ahmadiyah, as demanded by Muslim 
hard-liners, they would not be able to live in Indonesia.   
Another question which needs to be answered is the position of 
the joint ministerial decree itself. In fact, such a ministerial decree 
should not have been issued at all. The reason is that the decree is 
contrary to a higher level of law, in this case, the Indonesian 
Constitution and also the ratification of ICCPR. The hierarchy of laws 
in Indonesia can be seen in the Law No. 10/2004 on regulations 
relating to the Constitution55. In this particular law it is stated that the 
highest level of law in Indonesia is Constitutional law; the second is 
Law or Government regulation in lieu Law; the third is Government 
regulation; the fourth is Presidential regulation; and the fifth is district 
regulation. From this we can conclude that a joint ministerial decree 
has no place in the hierarchy of Indonesian law, and that this decree is 
highly dubious and debatable, especially in terms of its position. Thus, 
as many humanist activists in Indonesia claimed, in light of both the 
Constitution and human right laws, the decree was not legally binding. 
They even demanded that the government annul the decree against 
Jamaah Ahmadiyah because in their opinion, the decree violates the 
Constitution and legalizes crimes against a minority Islamic group.56    
This fact raises many questions, especially regarding the solution 
this dispute. On the one hand, Indonesia has ratified ICPPR in Law 
No. 12/2005, which declares the importance of freedom of religion. 
                                                 
55 Complete draft can be accessed at http://www.depkumham.go.id/NR/rdonlyres/-
1727EB6A-5E5E-45B3-9414-38EC7D7F2CA7/0/UNDANGundangNo10tahun-
2004ttgPPP.pdf (Indonesian version). [Accessed: 1 August 2009]. 
56 “Ahmadiyah Decree Seen as Legalizing Violence,” The Jakarta Post, 6 November 
2008. Accessed online at http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2008/06/11/ahma-
diyah-decree-seen-legalizing-violence.html. [Accessed: 1 August 2009].  
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On the other hand the joint ministerial decree condemns the existence 
of Ahmadiyah by forbidding their beliefs, and accuses them of 
deviating from Islam. Surely, these two regulations are self-contra-
dictory and confusing, particularly for the believers of Ahmadiyah. As 
a consequence, many activists have requested the annulment of the 
joint ministerial decree, stating that in their opinion the decree does 
not exist in the hierarchy of Indonesian law. However, the process of 
annulment is not simple. One possible way to solve this problem is to 
review this decree in the Constitutional Court. Because ICCPR was 
ratified as the Law No. 12/2005, it can be said that ICCPR is domestic 
law, and as a result, the process of judicial review can take place 
through the Constitutional Court.   
Nonetheless, this process too is problematic. It has been 
mentioned above that the joint ministerial decree does not exist in the 
hierarchy of Indonesian law; therefore there are doubts about the 
process of its judicial review. This problem is raised by Mahfud MD, 
chief of Indonesian Constitutional Court, who claims that the joint 
ministerial decree against Jamaah Ahmadiyah cannot be reviewed 
through Constitutional Court because the decree cannot be categorized 
as a law as mentioned in the Law No. 10/2004. Fortunately, Mahfud 
provides a solution to this matter. First, the President must annul this 
decree, because it was made by his ministers and the president has the 
right to annul it. Second, through judicial review, the law on religious 
deviation and offence (No. 1/PNPS/1965, not the decree itself, is 
revised. This law was used as the legal basis of the decree; if it is 
annulled, so is the decree.57  
This dispute over the position of the decree results from 
inconsistency in the actions of the government. If the government had 
reacted consistently to the case of Ahmadiyah, with reference to the 
constitution and law, neither the decree nor the violence against 
Ahmadiyah would have happened. The reaction of the government to 
the fatwa> of the MUI regarding Ahmadiyah issued in 1980’s was very 
different from the recent reaction. In 1980’s, even though the MUI 
condemned Ahmadiyah as a deviant sect, the government didn’t react 
negatively but still allowed them to live and practice their rituals. 
However, the reaction to the fatwa> in 2005 was completely different. 
                                                 
57  The statement can be accessed through http://www.menkokesra.go.id/content-
/view/8246/39/. [Accessed: 1 August 2009].  
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The government reacted negatively and abruptly issued a joint 
ministerial decree banning Ahmadiyah activities. According to reports 
by the International Crisis Group, this resulted from a consolidation of 
radical movements to put pressure on the government and repeated 
mass demonstrations demanding a ban on the Ahmadiyah group. 
These radical groups are based mostly in Jakarta; they are highly visible, 
well-organized and well-funded. To a certain extent, these radical 
groups have adapted well to the role of civil society in a democratic 
country. They are able to build networks and even create an intra-
parliamentary movement to press public officials to support a policy 
such as the joint ministerial decree.58 In other words, this decree was 
passed not to address the needs of society or its legal, foundations, but 
more  as an effort to please radical groups in society.   
Conclusion 
It can be concluded that the freedom of religion in Indonesia is 
not really free. It is confined only to six religions. For that matter, 
living in Indonesia with a religion other than those six religions is 
impossible. To a certain extent, this arrangement is against the 
universal meaning of religious freedom as mentioned in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
Regarding the Ahmadiyah case, the joint ministerial decree issued 
by the Indonesian government violated major laws in Indonesia such 
as its Constitution and other higher laws, and also universal ones such 
as the UDHR and ICCPR. It is a fact that Indonesia has ratified both 
the declaration and the covenant; despite this, because of strong 
demands by Muslim hard-liners in Indonesia, the government went 
ahead and issued the decree. This decree was not really based on its 
benefits for society but more on certain religious and political factors. 
Furthermore, the decree did not take into consideration the articles of 
the Indonesian Constitution and, in fact, is conspicuously against the 
that constitution and national law. For the sake of the Indonesian 
Constitution and law, it is recommended by many activists that the 
Indonesian government annul this decree. However, with the rapid 
growth of the Muslims hard-liners in Indonesia, this prospect seems 
not very likely in the short time. What can be done is to review the 
                                                 
58 International Crisis Group report on Ahmadiyah, p, 6. 
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decree to the Constitutional Court. This effort is not an easy task and 
will take much time, energy and money. But it is important to make 
such an effort in order to gain the supremacy of law, because if this 
uncertainty persists, freedom of religion in Indonesia will remain in 
danger, and the threat of violence will continue. [] 
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